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The measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol plays an
important role in quantum communications due to its high level of security and practicability. It
can be immune to all side-channel attacks directed on the detecting devices. However, the protocol
still contains strict requirements during state preparation in most existing MDI-QKD schemes,
e.g., perfect state preparation or perfectly characterized sources, which are very hard to realize in
practice. In this letter, we investigate uncharacterized MDI-QKD by utilizing a three-state method,
greatly reducing the finite-size effect. The only requirement for state preparation is that the state
are prepared in a bidimensional Hilbert space. Furthermore, a proof-of-principle demonstration over
a 170 km transmission distance is achieved, representing the longest transmission distance under
the same security level on record.
PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
INTRODUCTION
The quantum computer [1, 2], which is capable of ex-
ponentially faster execution speeds, is threatening con-
ventional public cryptosystems based on computational
complexity. Fortunately, the quantum key distribution
(QKD) has come into being, which allows two remote
legitimate users (Alice and Bob) to share cryptographic
keys with information-theoretic security based on quan-
tum physics [3–5], causing a new revolution in secure
communication. Since the first BB84 protocol [6] was
put forward in 1984, plenty of works have been devoted
to security both in theory and experiment [7–11]. Among
them, the device-independent (DI) QKD possesses the
highest level of security. However, it is very sensitive
to losses from either of the channels or detection equip-
ment, and thus difficult to realize with current technol-
ogy. Then, the measurement-device-independent QKD
(MDI-QKD) was proposed [12, 13], removing all risk of
side-channel attacks directed at the detector and reach-
ing a good balance between security and practicality. Up
to today, many MDI-QKD experimental demonstrations
have been performed [14–17], showing great potential for
real-life implementations.
Although the MDI-QKD protocol can defend against
all side-channel attacks, it does still have requirements for
the state-preparation process that can be a great chal-
lenge in practical implementations. To protect against
state-preparation imperfections, some countermeasures
have been raised, such as loss-tolerant methods [18, 19].
Nonetheless, they require a detailed characterization of
the prepared states, making the QKD system much more
complicated. Recently, Yin et al. proposed a method
[20, 21] incorporating mismatched-basis data into the
phase-error rate calculation. The only assumption is
that the prepared states are in a two-dimensional Hilbert
space, greatly reducing the complexity of experiment re-
alization. Soon afterwards, some related theoretical and
experimental works [22–25] were published. However,
they are inefficient in either the phase-error estimations
[21–23] or the decoy-state method employed [24]. Here
we investigate the three-state MDI-QKD protocol with
uncharacterized sources, and carry out a corresponding
experimental demonstration. Under the same security
level, we achieve a new record distance of 170 km with
pigtailed fibers.
Before presenting the protocol, we should declare that
our protocol can be implemented with different decoy-
state methods, e.g., a three-intensity [26] or four-intensity
[27] scheme. Here for simplicity, we only use the three-
intensity method for illustration. Now let’s briefly intro-
duce the scheme, and more detailed descriptions will be
available in the supplementary material [28].
First, Alice and Bob randomly prepare their weak
coherent sources (WCS) into three different intensities
(u, v, o) in a Z or X basis, then they send the signal out
to Charlie; here u and v each represents the signal and the
decoy state, respectively; o refers to the vacuum state. In
the Z basis, the bidimensional encoding states prepared
by Alice and Bob can be denoted as |ϕm〉 and |ϕ′n〉 re-
spectively, where m,n ∈ {0, 1}. Noting that, here |ϕm〉
and |ϕ′n〉 do not have to be ideal BB84 states. In the
X basis, in contrast to the original uncharacterized pro-
tocols [21–23, 25], here only one state is required. By
appending corresponding phases (θ, θ′) to the superposi-
tion of the states in the Z basis, the final states can be
written as
|ϕ2〉 = c0 |ϕ0〉+ c1eiθ |ϕ1〉 ,
|ϕ′
2
〉 = c′
0
|ϕ′
0
〉+ c′
1
eiθ
′ |ϕ′
1
〉 , (1)
2where cx and c
′
x are non-negative real numbers (x ∈
{0, 1}). These uncertainty values indicate that the states
are also uncharacterized as is the case in the Z basis, and
can even be unknown to Alice and Bob.
Second, Charlie performs Bell-state measurements on
the pulse-pairs received from Alice and Bob, and an-
nounces the results of successful events. Then Alice
and Bob exchange the basis-choice information. Differ-
ing from traditional MDI-QKD protocol, here they keep
all effective events including those with matched or mis-
matched bases. Here, a matched (or mismatched) basis
means that Alice and Bob chose the same (or different)
basis.
Finally, Alice and Bob carry out parameter estimation
and post-processing, obtaining the secure keys. In the
process, the phase error rate ep is estimated by utilizing
the data from matched and mismatched bases:
ep ≤
2p00 + 2p11 + p01 + p10 + 2
√
p01p10f(c0, c1, c
′
0, c
′
1)
2(p00 + p11 + p01 + p10)
.
(2)
For the convenience of the experiment, we only consider
the |Ψ−〉 projection measurement. pmn represents the
yield of a successful event when Allice (Bob) sends a sin-
gle photon pulse in the state |ϕm〉 (|ϕ′n〉), m,n ∈ {0, 1, 2},
and
f(c0, c1, c
′
0
, c′
1
)
=
∣∣√p22 +√p00c0c′1 +√p11c1c′0
∣∣2 − p01c20c′02 − p10c21c′12
2
√
p01p10c0c
′
0
c1c
′
1
.
(3)
For a better estimation of ep, f(c0, c1, c
′
0
, c′
1
) should be
minimized according to several constraints (see supple-
mentary material for more details [28]).
Finally, the secure key rate is accordingly given by:
R = (pupZ|u)
2
{
(e−uu)
2
Y11[1−H(ep)]−QZZuu fH(EZZuu )
}
,
(4)
where H(x) = −x log
2
(x) − (1− x) log
2
(1− x) is the bi-
nary Shannon entropy function; Y11 is the single-photon
yield; QZZuu and E
ZZ
uu are gain and average quantum bit
error rate (QBER), respectively, when Alice and Bob
both choose a signal state with a Z basis; f is the er-
ror correction efficiency which we assign to be 1.16; pu
is the probability of preparing signal states, and pZ|u is
the probability of choosing the Z basis conditional on
the signal state. Note that, the X basis is only for er-
ror estimation and the Z basis is for final key generation.
Therefore, the three-state method in this work will not
introduce an extra security problem.
Our experimental setup is depicted in Fig. 1. We ap-
ply the time-bin phase encoding scheme, and utilize in-
tensity modulators (IMs) and FaradayMichelson interfer-
ometers (FMIs) [29] as the key apparatuses of encoding.
Two narrow linewidth continuous-wave lasers are used as
light sources (Clarity NLL-1550-LP) whose frequencies
are locked to the molecular absorption line with a cen-
ter wavelength of 1550.51 nm. On either Alice or Bob’s
side, the light source is chopped by IM1 and IM2 into a
pulse train with a 3 ns temporal width and a repetition
rate of 50 MHz. Note that IM1 is used for decoy-state
modulation and IM2 for extinction ratio improvement.
On each side, the FMI, composed of a phase modulator
(PM), a 50/50 beam splitter (BS) and two Faraday mir-
rors (FMs), separates each incoming pulse into two time
bins with a temporal difference of 10.3 ns. The FM con-
tains a 45
◦
Faraday rotator and a total reflector. Phase
encoding in the X basis can be performed by control-
ling the PM to add an extra phase at the long arm. As
demonstrated in Ref. [29], an FMI is insensitive to polar-
ization disturbance in both arms, and thus can maintain
stable performance in real-life applications. A circulator
is inserted before the FMI to filter the laser light reflected
backwards by the FMs.
The following IM3 and IM4 are applied for basis choice
and time-bin encoding. For the Z basis, only the former
or the later pulse, each representing a 0 or 1 bit, is allowed
to pass through. Here, two cascaded IMs are utilized to
suppress the noise and get a high extinction ratio for ei-
ther the vacuum state or the coding Z states. Benefiting
from this, here the corresponding inherent error rate in
the Z basis is only 0.15%. Moreover, IM3 and IM4 can
also be used to balance the intensity difference in the two
time slots of the X basis, caused by the insertion loss of
the PM. The bits are encoded in the relative phase of
the two pulses. Additionally, normalization of the aver-
age photon number in the two bases is performed. An
arbitrary waveform generator controls the full encoding
process at a clock rate of 50 MHz. Then, the coded pulses
are adjusted by an attenuator (ATT) to the single-photon
level before being sent out to Charlie through quantum
channels.
At the detection stage (Charlie), four commer-
cial super-conducting nanowire single-photon detectors
(SNSPDs: TCOPRS-CCR-SW-85, SCONTEL company)
work at 2.3 K, providing an 85% detection efficiency at
a dark count rate of 12 Hz after gating with a time win-
dow of 2 ns. Charlie performs the |Ψ−〉 projection mea-
surement by causing the incoming pulses to interfere. A
time-to-digital converter records the clicks from SNSPD1
and SNSPD2, and counts the corresponding two-fold co-
incidences.
HongOuMandel (HOM) interference is the key point of
MDI-QKD. For better interference, we implement a nar-
row linewidth continuous-wave laser with high accuracy
in the frequency domain, which contributes to the easy
overlap of two independent pulses temporally and spec-
trally. Polarization correction modules are also applied
by monitoring the reflection parts from the polarization
beam splitters (PBSs) with SNSPD3 and SNSPD4 while
the electronic polarization controllers (EPCs) compen-
3FIG. 1. Schematic setup of MDI-QKD with uncharacterized sources. Laser, continuous-wave laser; IM, intensity modulator;
PM, phase modulator; Circ, circulator; FM, Faraday mirror; ATT, attenuator; EPC, electronic polarization controller; BS:
beam splitter; SNSPD, super-conducting nanowire single-photon detector.
sate for the polarization drift every 20 minutes. Owing to
the stable HOM interference, the misalignment error rate
in the X basis is 1.5%. To achieve a free-running system,
we compensate the phase drift of the FMIs and calibrate
the direct-current bias voltages of the IMs by quickly
scanning the voltages and analyzing the corresponding
count events. Considering the extra time consumed, the
duty cycle of transmission is around 90%, which can be
further improved by machine learning techniques [30].
We run our experiment with two coiled commercial
standard single-mode fibers (0.18 dB/km) with 100 km
and 170 km transmission distance. The overall efficiency
including the EPC, PBS, BS and detectors at Charlie’s
side is 67%. In this work, we consider the finite-data
size effect [22, 25] which is absent in Ref. [23]. The
total number of pulses sent by Alice or Bob is 1013. All
the intensities and probabilities are optimized for better
performance (see supplementary material for details [28])
according to the system parameters. After collecting all
the data, we estimate the phase errors and calculate the
final secure key rates.
The theoretical and experimental results are shown in
Fig. 2. The transmission distance of our new method ex-
tends up to 200 km in theory. Compared with the result
of Ref. [21] using the same experimental parameters, our
result exhibits significant improvement both in transmis-
sion distance and key rate. Thanks to the stability of
the system, our experimental data show good agreement
with the theoretical predictions. At 100 km and 170 km,
we obtain the key rates of 2.36 × 10−5 and 7.06 × 10−8
per pulse respectively, and other crucial values for calcu-
lating the key rate are listed out in Table. I. Generally,
the QBER is considerably low, which is one of the most
decisive factors determining the key rate.
In Fig. 2, we also mark the experimental data of
Refs. [19, 23] for comparison. Note that, the work of
Wang et al. [23] presents an MDI-QKD with uncharacter-
ized sources applying an original four-state method [21],
and the work of Tang et al. [19] utilizes a loss-tolerant
method. These experiments, including our work, possess
similar security levels (except that [23] did not take the
finite size effect into account), since they can not only
close the loopholes at the detection side, but also toler-
ate errors in state preparation. By comparison, our result
extends the secure transmission distance up to 170 km
which is the longest demonstrated transmission distance
under the same security level to date. In addition, al-
though statistical fluctuation is considered, our key rate
over short distances remains more than two orders of
magnitude higher. Three main advantages contribute
to our better performance: first, we adopt the three-
state method and place a tight bound on phase error;
second, the SNSPDs provide higher detection efficiency
while maintaining a low dark-count rate; finally, cascade
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FIG. 2. Theoretical and experimental results of the key rate’s
dependence on the transmission distance. The red solid line
is our simulation result; the dots represent our key rates with
100 km and 170 km fibers; the blue triangles are for the re-
sults in the work of Wang et.al [23], and the black solid line
represents its theoretical result [21] using our experimental
parameters; the green squares are the results of Tang et.al
[19].
connection of IM3 and IM4 contributes to a lower error
rate in the Z basis. Additionally, in the work of Tang
et.al, state tomography is performed to characterize the
state-preparation errors which increases complexity of re-
alization. By contrast, no extra operation is taken in our
work. We simply consider the mismatched-basis data,
discarded in original MDI-QKD protocol, in the calcula-
tion. Moreover, one less state is prepared and the sys-
tem can be further simplified. Especially, in some chip-
based QKD system[31], it may be difficult to prepare four
states, and hence the method in this work will be more
easily applicable.
TABLE I. Crucial values in the key rate formula: estimated
single photon yield (Y11) and phase error rate (ep); measured
values of QBER (EZZuu ) and gain (Q
ZZ
uu ) when Alice and Bob
both prepare the signal state in the Z basis. ).
Distance Y11 ep E
ZZ
uu Q
ZZ
uu
100km 0.015 0.15 0.0017 5.85×10−4
170km 7.68×10−5 0.27 0.0021 7.53×10−6
In summary, we have proposed a three-state MDI-
QKD protocol with uncharacterized sources and carried
out a corresponding experimental demonstration. In the
protocol, one does not need to characterize the sources
and thus the requirements of the state preparations are
relaxed; meanwhile, it is immune to all side-channel at-
tacks on the detection side due to its MDI characteris-
tics. It thus possesses the highest level of security among
all practical QKD protocols. Moreover, not only an im-
proved phase estimation method but also a simple three-
state scheme is implemented to obtain substantially en-
hanced performance compared with other uncharacter-
ized or loss tolerant MDI-QKD schemes. Furthermore,
by incorporating a state-of-art experimental setup, we
have reached a record 170 km transmission distance un-
der the same security level. Therefore, our work repre-
sents a further step towards the practical implementation
of QKD.
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